

**00527**

**1962/10/19**

10/19 - 11:2 AM

all including Dean Acheson, Allen  
Rush, Ball, Johnson, Thompson, Merton  
Rising by Sundahl -

28 - 28 numbers

28 - 5 AM

35 - May 21 ± +4 probables

note asked if we had it all  
McCune said not all - maybe  
30% - or double or triple

Oliver reviewed estimate - appendix  
and some - gave AP to C. C. C.

Exchange of discussion of Appendix  
Conclusions limited action  
results were re-evaluation items  
also summary

Myrhyke remarks - Sov assistance  
policy defensive - help industry  
- help agriculture  
Note of 22 notes on this

Katzenbach - No problems in  
establishing blockade except  
difficultly - investigation OAS  
and looking to U.N. Pres needs  
no more authority - Declaration  
was not necessary and  
contrary to Int. Law and  
U.N. Charter

No classification indicated

CIA, JF 8080/285A,

Box 61

OCI Memo with  
the President, ~~Director~~

10/19 - 30 June 1962

1402 - 31 November 1962

ST/Sm/14

44432

2) Need to justify action on  
 reason other than attack on Temple  
 of Athens - U.N. GA action  
 unavoidable - Under OAS and UN  
 resolution we cannot use force  
 argument of special region of law  
 in OAS, West Hemisphere US  
 special privilege - This will  
 not stand up, to make our  
 action legal must have action  
 under art. 6 & 8 of OAS treaty  
 Martin believes we could get  
 14 votes easily. This would  
 leave any use of force -  
 action. If discussion is on  
 a basis of legal steps, the  
 steps were coming in we will  
 not get away from and  
 resolution would be established  
 if legal steps are to get  
 approval of OAS. Any form  
 there we would not get  
 approval but action does  
 not decline. This necessary  
 and the union of the  
 members of the union.

"Declassified for Publication in  
 Foreign Relations of the United States"

CIA, JF 80801285A)  
 Box 61  
 DCI Memo with  
 the President, 1 December  
 1961 - 30 June 1962

2 of 4

111-433

3) Wilson supports a

Real such for summary of last night meeting, W.C.N. expanded in 3 corners

- 1 - Political
- 2 - Limited blockade which might escalate
- 3 - Full strike I-II-III plus threat to quarantine (300-400 sorties)

Pres tentative decision (2)

Decision to remain - action on Monday or Tuesday -

Bundy says not sure of Pres state of mind - Talked with Pres this AM - Not sure how well if we did not offer more than one chance of action -

Taylor - JCS strongly favor military action - think against all human resolution in difficulties of blockade and surveillance  
Overstated

CIA, JF 80801285A,

Box 61

DCI Meeting with

the President, 1 December

1961 - 30 June 1962

314

CV 1124

CWII-7114

4) AG - eliminate phase in  
 new arguments for 2 and 7  
 Falls Pres. will have different  
 time attacking Cuba 6/11/60 as  
 some great moral problems  
 and relationship with other  
 countries. ICB - in USSR one  
 just a dangerous or neutral  
 in Cuba - OK to make both  
 reactions but must discuss  
 most difficult.

Thompson power blockade but  
 feels it will escalate - Gromyko  
 feels we will have show down  
 and we must show best time  
 killing some <sup>in Cuba</sup> <sup>possible</sup>  
 Cuban when we get into a  
 showdown we see danger  
 of nuclear war and if we  
 fear this then K will win  
 lot of Latin America - Do  
 we know Castro will not  
 remedy have these missile  
 blockade will not require  
 missiles - Therefore they  
 will become operational  
 and we can name again act -

"Declassified for Publication in  
 Foreign Relations of the United States"

CIA, JF 80801285A,

Box 61

OCT Meeting with  
 the President, 1 December  
 1961 - 30 June 1962

484

4443